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ABSTRACT: Occupying an eccentric position with respect to critical theories, Foucault pre-
figures a queer critical thought and practice.   In this paper I make a case for the continuing 
importance of Foucault for rethinking feminism within the context of neoliberal governmen-
tality despite continuing skepticism about the value of his ethical writings. I draw not only 
upon the work of Foucault, but also that of queer feminist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick.    
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Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is what needs to 
be done.” ...It is a challenge directed to what is. 1 
 
It seems to me that contemporary political thought allows very little room for the question of the 
ethical subject.2  
 
We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers.3   
 
Foucault and Queer Feminism 
How do we envision a queer feminist thought that continues to critically engage capitalism, 
techniques of power and domination, and subjection without relying upon Enlightenment 
humanism, whether in its more reformist liberal or Marxist formulations?  What does Foucault 
offer those of us post-identity feminists interested in critical thought and social change in the 
current context of neoliberal capitalism?  How might turning to queer theory deepen and ex-
tend his insights in ways that are amenable to such feminist purposes?  In what follows I ad-
dress two of Foucault’s key contributions.  This is done to make a case for his continuing im-
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 
1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press: 1994), 246-258, 256. 
2 Michel Foucault, “Ethics of Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections 
from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New 
Press: 1994), 25-42, 36. 
3 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984: Volume One, Ethics, 
edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: The New Press: 1994), 303-319, 315. 
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portance, if not sufficiency, for any feminist engaged in radical critique in the name of free-
dom: his understanding of thought as a critical (and ethical) practice designed to loosen our 
attachment to present ways of thinking and doing; and the role of self-constitution or practices 
of freedom in his ethics.  Insofar as Foucault regarded his books as “experience books” intend-
ed not only altered his relationship to himself and his present, but also to create transforma-
tive experiences in readers, his critical thought and archival research also constitute part of an 
overarching ethical project designed to enhance freedom by transforming our relationship to 
our present and thus ourselves—to alter our sense of how it might be possible to think and 
live.4  
I argue for the desirability of a “queer feminism,” a term that refers to an eccentric, 
provocative and unruly feminist practice, one able to risk, challenge, and transform itself, any 
static sense of its beloved objects and self-understandings, its sense of temporal and spatial 
orders.5  Such a queer project does not limit itself to focusing on sexuality or gender at all, nor 
must it rule out talk of subordination and domination, yet it might draw upon certain mo-
ments in queer theory that take up Foucaultian intuitions in compelling ways.   One such mo-
ment, the later writings of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, is particularly compelling insofar as 
Sedgwick fleshes out and extends Foucault’s project of “thinking [and being] otherwise.”6 
Sedgwick not only engages in an experiment of non-binary thinking, but she also recognizes a 
middle range of agency, an ethical project  in which subjects constitute and sustain themselves 
by reworking the materials made available within the conditions in which they find them-
selves.  Thus, she offers us a way of thinking about how to undo our attachments to particular 
self-understandings and practices and create others in the midst of subjection, normalization 
and the intensification of neoliberalism. 
Linking Foucault’s critical thought to “queer” thinking, draws attention to its eccentric 
character, its differences from modern emancipatory theories, their theoretical aspirations, and 
ontological commitments.  It could be especially important at moments when dominant politi-
cal theories have reached an impasse, lost currency—moments when the time is ripe for a new 
direction in thinking. 
Perhaps this is our time.  Left feminist critic Wendy Brown captures the spirit of our 
time poignantly when she asks: “what does it mean for feminist scholars to be working in a 
time after revolution, after the loss of belief in the possibility and the viability of a radical over-
throw of existing social relations?”7  Furthermore, she observes that neoliberal capitalism “nei-
ther loves nor hates social differences… it exploits them in the short run and erodes them in 
                                                 
4 See Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2009), for treatment of his project as an “erotic ethics.”  
5 See, for example, Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology:  Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC:  Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2006) and Elizabeth Grosz, The Nick of Time:  Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely (Durham, NC:  
Duke University Press, 2004) on the importance of rethinking space and time within a queer feminist project.  
6 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performance (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003).  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality:  The Use of Pleasure, Vol. 2 (NY: Vintage Press, 1990), 9. 
7 Wendy Brown, “Feminism Unbound: Revolution, Mourning, Politics,” in Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 98-115, 99. 




the long run.”8  Lamenting the emergence and spread of the neoliberal “idea of the self as en-
terprise with its attendant extension of economic modes of rationality to all aspects of every-
day life,” she captures neoliberalism’s capacity to tolerate and even profit from diversity and 
the queering of identity, a development that, according to some queer feminist theorists, nulli-
fies the resistant potential of this strategy.9  
To be sure, some feminists might regard Brown’s and other queer feminists’ embrace of 
a post-revolutionary, post-identity feminism as tantamount to a departure from feminism.  
After all, feminist theorists and philosophers still rely heavily upon liberal and socialist 
frameworks.  Despite the fact that liberalism and Marxism are typically opposed to one anoth-
er, both share an analysis of power that Foucault questioned.  Adopting one or the other, as 
many second wave feminists did, committed them to one of at least three possible general 
strategies: seek equality with men, overturn the damaging values associated with masculinity 
and femininity while accepting some residual gender difference, or move beyond sex and 
gender altogether—to a time when sex and gender would lose their significance as markers of 
difference and human worth.  These are not unreasonable tactics in particular situations.   
Even Foucault endorsed strategic liberal moves such as the demand for homosexual rights, 
regarding them as valuable but insufficient.  Yet, despite his later hostility toward the Com-
munist party, he chose to align himself with leftists.  At the same time Foucault posed ques-
tions to politics as usual rather than endorse or reject any particular political theory and its 
program of social transformation.    
Whether feminists are drawn to Foucault will depend upon their understanding of 
feminism and their sense of the main dangers confronting women in the world today.  In any 
case, many of us queer critics can and should identify with feminism, with a sense that talk of 
subordination, normalization, and biopolitical regulation of women remains a significant and 
useful project.10  For example, women across the globe continue to be paid less than men; they 
are still more likely to be the targets of sexual assault or to be trafficked for sex and domestic 
work, and the working conditions for many women are abhorrent.11  In the U.S. abortion 
                                                 
8 Brown, 106. 
9 Ibid., 106.  To be sure, there is a growing literature opposed to my suggestion that queer practices can be 
mobilized against current modalities of power associated with neoliberal governmentality, for example, 
Shannon Winnubst, “The Queer Thing about Neoliberal Pleasure: A Foucauldian Warning,” in Foucault 
Studies: Special Issue on Queer Theory, edited by Jana Sawicki and Shannon Winnubst, no. 14 (September 
2012), 79-97; Ladelle McWhorter, “Queer Economies,” in Foucault Studies: Special Issue on Queer Theory, edited 
by Jana Sawicki and Shannon Winnubst, Foucault Studies, no. 14: 61-78; Lois McNay, “Self as Enterprise: Di-
lemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics,” Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 26 (6) 
(2009), 55-77.  I respond to some of the key counter-arguments in what follows. 
10 To be sure, many have.  Judith Butler, Eve Kosofky Sedgwick, and, I would add, more recently, Juana Ma-
ria Rodriguez, Cressida Heyes, Lynne Huffer, and Shannon Winnubst to name only a few, each appropriate 
Foucault and queer theory as feminists. See Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge Press, 
2004); Sedgwick; Juana Maria Rodriguez, Queer Latinidad:  Identity Practices, Discursive Spaces (NY: New York 
University Press, 2003; Cressida Heyes, Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Huffer, Winnubst. 
11 See Carole S. Vance’s subtle and sophisticated analysis of melodramatic distortions in feminist literatures 
on sex trafficking that threaten to undermine progressive legal remedies focused on exploitation of labor 
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rights are still under attack, poverty is still feminized, and beauty standards are dispropor-
tionately applied to women.  Feminist commitments to resisting the domination and subordi-
nation of women need not rule out focusing on non-feminist resources in our efforts to recog-
nize and resist the most perilous trends facing women across the globe.  Moving beyond the 
limits of modern Western feminism could be understood as part of a necessary project of fem-
inism’s self-overcoming—one that cultivates attunement to the myriad forms that subordina-
tion and domination of women can take, including subordination that deploys Western femi-
nism as well as queer theory in imperialist ways.12 
Most importantly, Foucault’s analytic of power and his queer approach to critique need 
not entail abandoning a focus on the subordination and subjection of women and the intolera-
ble conditions in which some women live in the U.S. and across the globe.  At the same time 
any appropriation of Foucault does question the possibility of human, thus women’s emanci-
pation, because of its necessary sensitivity to the ubiquity of power relations and the links be-
tween truth and power, its methodological refusal of liberal and Marxist economic under-
standings of power as a transferable possession, the specificity and multiplicity of women’s 
situations, and the historical forces operating upon us such that we are often unaware of both 
the conditions that make present ways of thinking possible and what we think and do.  But 
even if Foucault questioned the possibility and desirability of thinking in terms of total revolu-
tion, and by extension the emancipation of women as a group, his critical approach continues 
to be indispensable for freeing us from habits of thinking and doing that limit us to specific 
and unnecessarily constraining relations of power/knowledge within the present.13  
Using Foucault does not commit us to any particular theory at all.  Nor does it commit 
us to rejecting one.  Instead he offers resources for those who want to fight specific and unnec-
essary or questionable constraints on freedom.  Moreover, he does not offer us a theory of 
power, but a critico-historical ethical practice, in which he diagnoses trends in the present, 
develops an analytic of power, and identifies resources in the Western tradition for thinking 
and being otherwise.  As I have indicated, one such trend is the emergence of neoliberal gov-
ernmentality—a trend in global capitalism that Foucault presciently diagnosed thirty years 
ago.   
                                                                                                                                                                  
rather than prostitution: Carole S. Vance, “Thinking Trafficking, Thinking Sex,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and 
Gay Studies, volume 17, number 1 (2011), 135-143. 
12 For examples of the former, see Kelly Oliver, Women as Weapons of War: Iraq, Sex and the Media (New York:  
Columbia University Press, 2007), and the latter, Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer 
Times (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). 
13 Foucault remarks: “In fact, we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contem-
porary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another 
culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.  I prefer the 
very specific transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a certain number of 
areas which concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes, the 
way in which we perceive insanity or illness; I prefer even these partial transformations, which have been 
made in the correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude, to the programs for a new man that 
the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century.” (Foucault, “What is Enlight-
enment?,” 316)  




Thus, in occupying an eccentric position with respect to emancipatory theory, Foucault 
prefigured a queer critical practice that may be more important today than ever before.  Nei-
ther Marxist nor liberal, Foucault invites us to think about and invent a form of governmental-
ity that might increase practices of freedom, a form that he once suggested might be “appro-
priate” to a new form of socialism, rather than one that simply reverses power relations within 
established orders.14  Doing the latter, he suggests, does not change who we have become in 
the regimes of power/knowledge within which we find ourselves—hence he also turns to ethi-
cal work on the self, to practices of freedom necessary for the emergence of other ways of liv-
ing. 
 
Foucault’s Thought as a Queer Critical Practice 
What I am doing in what follows is not particularly Foucauldian.  I talk about him rather than 
do what he did in order to emphasize the eccentricity and the surprisingly modest aims of his 
critical project.  Foucault’s queer position vis-à-vis existing ideological categories amused 
him.15  Rather than use critique to advance a political solution to a particular problem, he be-
lieved that the intensification of power/knowledge regimes associated with madness, punish-
ment and sexuality, and ultimately, biopolitics, economics and neoliberalism, posed questions 
for politics as usual.  The form of his critique owed something to observing the events of May 
1968 when new social movements posed questions not addressed within extant emancipatory 
theories, particularly Marxism—”questions about women, about relations between the sexes, 
about medicine, about mental illness, about the environment, about minorities, about delin-
quency.”16  In each of these experiences Foucault identified three “fundamental elements”: “a 
game of truth, relations of power, and forms of relation to oneself and others.”17  Here we see 
the familiar triad of concepts associated with Foucault: knowledge, power, subjectivation, or 
in a later formulation, modes of veridiction, governmentality, and subjectivation.  He clarifies 
and redescribes his project in this interview in an illuminating way, namely, as a thought prac-
tice and a history of problematizations:  
 
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it meaning; rather, it is what allows 
one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of 
thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and goals.  Thought is freedom in 
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, translated by Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 94. 
15 In a 1984 interview Foucault remarked: “I think I have in fact been situated in most of the squares of on the 
political checkerboard, one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or 
disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in service of Gaullism, new liberal, and 
so on... None of these descriptions is important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean some-
thing.  And I must admit that I rather like what they mean.  It’s true that I prefer not to identify myself, and 
that I’m amused by the diversity of ways I’ve been judged and classified.” (Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Poli-
tics and Problematizations,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, 
edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: The New Press, 1994), 18-24, 20).  
16 Foucault, “Questions of Method,” 21-22.  
17 Ibid., 23. 
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relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an 
object, and reflects on it as a problem.18 
 
Typically, to address social problems, political theorists engage in polemical battles about the 
best approaches (even Foucault occasionally did so).  In a polemical exchange the parties are 
not engaged in a search for truth; they are in an adversarial relationship in which neither party 
risks his or her own point view, each seeking to discredit or eliminate the others.  No new ide-
as are produced.  (A cursory glance at most blog sites and, increasingly, TV news, illustrates 
this point quite well.)  Instead polemicists aim (whether consciously or not) to conserve one set 
of views at the expense of another.  They are in effect caught within alternatives that may not 
be the only ones.  In the place of such polemics, a practice that he found ethically troubling 
given its violence toward the other, Foucault substituted what he called “thought.”  He asked: 
what makes a particular set of proposed solutions to emerging social problems possible, while 
others remain unimagined?  What is the “general form of problematization” that serves as 
their conditions of possibility?19  In writing genealogical histories of such problematizations 
Foucault’s goal was to “develop a given into a question” and thereby show us how the range 
of possible, often opposing, approaches for addressing problems (madness, penality, sexuali-
ty) has been either unnecessarily constrained or bound up with inequalities in ways that ob-
scure their pernicious effects.  Thus we might refuse particular problematizations and search 
for resources that enable us to think differently.  For example, feminists might ask: what ine-
qualities/power relations are obscured in our current ways of identifying problems and solu-
tions? What are the constraining justificatory regimes in which we find ourselves?  Where are 
we at an impasse in our thinking?  What questions should we be posing to politics as usual?  
How do we open up a space for something different to emerge, for a transformation in our 
relation to present thinking and to ourselves?  Of course this would require doing something 
like Foucault did.   
As I have indicated, some feminists have argued that Foucault’s understanding of 
power precludes speaking in terms of women’s subordination.  In order to challenge this read-
ing I find it useful to revisit some of the key features of Foucault’s analytic of power.  Succinct-
ly put, according to Foucault’s conception, “power is the name one gives to a complex strate-
gic situation in a given society.”20  At a certain stage of Foucault’s thinking he understands 
power as strictly relational, a moving substrate of relations of force that are asymmetrical and 
unbalanced, forces acting within a calculated set of strategies or rationalities—a “controlled 
game” of power.21  Note though that nothing in this provisional definition of power precludes 
acknowledging imbalances in force relations, nonsymmetrical relations.  This means that in 
certain situations one finds some individuals or groups at a disadvantage in relation to anoth-
er group.  It never means they cannot resist or fight back, or even reverse particular power 
                                                 
18 Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” 23.  (Emphasis added.) 
19 Ibid., 24.   
20 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974, translated by Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 16. 
21 Ibid., 13. 




relations at certain moments.  Sometimes a state of domination of one group by another, a 
state where no moves are possible, can result.22 
The aims of Foucault’s approach to an historical analytic of power are easily miscon-
strued.  As he points out in the 1978-1979 lectures, The Birth of Biopolitics, he begins his histori-
cal work with a study of practices as they are given and as they reflect upon themselves, not 
with already given objects, namely, “all those universals employed by sociological analysis, 
historical analysis, and political philosophy” such as the state, the people, civil society, mad-
ness, the delinquent, the hysteric, the pervert, and so forth.23  He continues: 
 
[I]nstead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with uni-
versals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices I would like to 
start with these concrete practices and, as it were pass these universals through the grid of 
these practices.24   
 
Thus, with respect to his study of madness, he notes:  
 
My question was not: Does madness exist?  My reasoning, my method, was not to examine 
whether history gives me or refers me to something like madness, and then to conclude, no, 
it does not, therefore madness does not exist... The method consisted in saying: Let’s sup-
pose that madness does not exist.  If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history 
make of these different events and practices which are apparently organized around some-
thing that is supposed to be madness. 25 
 
Consider extending this description to his study of sex and the dispositif of sexuality.  There his 
method consisted in supposing (not proving) that “sex” does not exist.  Once he suspends ref-
erence to the stated raison d’être for regulating bodies, pleasures, and relational norms as well 
as developing sciences of sexuality, he can bring into view many events and practices that use 
sex as an alibi for doing something else, namely, developing and integrating myriad tech-
niques for normalizing and disciplining individuals and regulating populations.  Finally, it is 
important to emphasize that he sets out to describe social and economic rationalities, not total-
                                                 
22 See Paul Patton, “From Resistance to Government: Foucault’s Lectures 1976-1979,” in A Companion to Fou-
cault, edited by Chris Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) for a 
discussion of the shifts in Foucault’s conceptualizations of power from earlier to late writings, course lec-
tures, and interviews.  Patton locates the most “definitive” statement of Foucault’s analytic of power in “The 
Subject and Power.” (See Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections from 
Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. New York: The New Press, 
1994), 126-144).  Note that the form of power associated with neoliberalism will involve a shift from concerns 
about training, discipline and normalization of individuals to forms of power associated with establishing 
statistical norms, and finding techniques for ensuring certain aggregate behaviors in populations.  The inte-
rior of subjects becomes less important than finding ways to “conduct the conduct” of individuals with more 
distant and less costly regulatory mechanisms than those required in the disciplinary society that Foucault 
described in his middle writings.  
23 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 3.    
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
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ities—that is, justificatory regimes, the conditions of possibility for the emergence of certain 
subject positions, what can be said, who can say them—conditions that establish what argu-
ments for and against any give practice or authority can be launched.  In effect Foucault 
brackets existing ontologies in favor of a project to map power/knowledge relations and prac-
tices of subject formation occluded within specific justificatory regimes or problematizations 
that do not question the given. 
Rather than tell a story about how history alters or invalidates concepts such as “mad-
ness,” “delinquency,” and “sex,” he maps the complex strategic situations and material pro-
cesses that he finds when he suspends universals at the start in order to diagnose trends in the 
present not visible otherwise.  To be sure, his historical work might suggest that things we 
take as given (sex is a good example) are historical or social constructs, but in fact Foucault did 
not set out to show this.  He begins with the suspension of the universal, to show us some-
thing else, namely, relations of power bound up with enabling, resisting, and ever-changing 
configurations of power/knowledge.  His lectures on governmentality—techniques and ra-
tionalities that emerge for conducting conduct—one’s own and that of others—also begin in 
the same way, they too are histories of governmental rationalities.  Insofar as any regime of 
power/knowledge establishes a specific rationality, it constrains the justificatory strategies 
available within that regime.  By mapping parts of these complex strategic games, Foucault in 
effect gives a better sense of possible moves we might make, and resources that the game af-
fords.  This would be just as true of his genealogical work on neoliberalism in The Birth of Bio-
politics.  It treats neoliberalism as a form of rationality, a justificatory regime, a complex strate-
gic situation, a pernicious trend, and not a social and political totality that pervades the globe, 
though it may threaten to become that.   
 
Self-Constitution and Ethics as a Practice of Freedom 
Judgments concerning the significance and value of Foucault’s turn to ancient Greco-Roman 
ethical practices in the wake of his lecture courses on governmentality are by no means univo-
cal; questions abound about what sort of work his forays into the ancient origins of our ethical 
thinking do in the present.  Do these writings represent an excavation of pre-Christian and 
pre-modern practices that might provide resources for countering the erosion of ethics within 
neoliberal governmentality, given its preoccupation with maximizing utilities, returns on hu-
man investment, and success or failure?  Is he simply excavating the genealogy of “desiring 
man”?  Is his concern principally political?  How do we relate the ethical to the political?  Is he 
pointing to possible resources for resisting present modalities of power?  Or to resources for a 
future time when we are freed from forms of domination at the current juncture? 
Feminist responses to Foucault’s ethical writings on ancient Greco-Roman ethical prac-
tices have ranged from outright dismissal to qualified and even enthusiastic endorsement.26 
                                                 
26 For some recent examples of the latter see Dianna Taylor, “Toward a Feminist Politics of Ourselves,” in A 
Companion to Foucault, edited by Chris Falzon, Timothy O’Leary and Jana Sawicki (New York: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013); Heyes; Jana Sawicki, “Foucault, Queer Theory, and the Discourse of Desire,” in Foucault and 
Philosophy, edited by Timothy O’Leary and Chris Falzon (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 185-203; and 
Amy Allen, The Politics of Ourselves: Power, Autonomy and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008). 




Those who reject the viability and desirability of this turn to ethics focus on what they regard 
as its depoliticizing, individualistic, and other-disregarding features.27  Others have pointed to 
the sexist conditions in which the different ancient Greek and Roman ethical schools at issue 
were developed.28  In a recent engagement with Foucault’s ethics, feminist critical theorist Lois 
McNay encapsulates key features of feminist critical responses.  McNay finds Foucault’s turn 
to ancient practices of self-constitution to be an inadequate resource for resisting neoliberal 
governmentality and the form of subjectivation associated with it, namely, the self as enter-
prise.  In what follows I offer a response to McNay that draws upon both Foucault and queer 
theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick to make a case for the importance of a Foucauldian version of 
ethical self-constitution today. 
In a series of course lectures delivered in the late 1970s Foucault refocused his attention 
from the disciplinary role of biopower described at the end of History of Sexuality, Volume 1, to 
the evolution of liberalism as a form of governmentality that targets populations.29  This form 
of governmentality emerged in the eighteenth century and depended upon new sciences of 
political economy and statistics that could deliver knowledge of natural regularities, occurring 
within populations: birth and death rates, disease rates, economic behaviors premised upon 
maximizing utilities, and so forth.30  Such knowledge enabled a form of social control linked 
less to disciplinary power than to mechanisms for managing populations.  Increasingly less 
concerned with enhancing and harnessing capacities of individual bodies by attaching them to 
normal and abnormal identities (sexual deviant, delinquent, mentally ill, etc.), this new form 
of governmentality shifts away from micro-techniques focused on surveillance, training, and 
normalization and toward using this new form of knowledge of regularities within popula-
tions to make decisions about how best to regulate and populations through market mecha-
nisms and other techniques for orienting conduct toward socially useful objectives.  Foucault 
traces a complicated evolution of liberalism and its promotion of laissez faire capitalism to 
more contemporary neoliberal governmentality in which competition is no longer understood 
as a natural occurrence but one that must instead be secured through government.  Govern-
ment’s purpose shifts from intervening to offset the destructive social effects of unrestrained 
economic freedom to securing the social and legal framework necessary to promote unfettered 
competition. 
With neoliberal governmentality comes a new form of subjection, namely, the self as 
enterprise, or homo oeconomicus.  Within this regime of power/knowledge, individuals are en-
couraged to differentiate themselves, be responsible for themselves, and govern themselves 
within a legal and social framework structured to regulate and promote competition.  Active 
self-governance replaces submission.  Furthermore, neoliberal governmentality can accom-
modate a range of social differences and values within its flexible market mechanisms.  It op-
                                                 
27 See, for example, Johanna Oksala, Foucault on Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and 
Lois McNay. 
28 Leo Bersani’s formulation of the issue reflects feminist sensibilities.  See Leo Bersani, Homos (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
29 See especially The Birth of Bioplitics. 
30 See Mary Beth Mader, Sleights of Reason: Norms, Bisexuality, Development (New York: SUNY Press, 2011) for 
an incisive and painstaking analysis of the power of norms. 
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erates at a distance from individuals, conducting their conduct from afar (consider marketing 
strategies used within Google or Amazon) rather than within myriad and costly disciplinary 
institutions focused on developing and training individuals.  Given this new modality of pow-
er, older binary models of struggle between forces or elements within society are increasingly 
inadequate for understanding how power is exercised, and resistance requires developing 
new tactics.  Poverty and inequality become examples of failure in the enterprise of selfhood, 
and entire populations might be warehoused or abandoned—rendered responsible for their 
failure to invest in themselves, to discipline and train themselves.31 
It is here that McNay locates a dilemma in Foucault’s turn to ethics in the wake of his 
lectures on biopolitics.  Insofar as the self is understood as an enterprise and the liberal under-
standings of the subject of rights as a limit to sovereign power is eroded, individual autonomy 
is depoliticized.  Instead of opposing or limiting abuses of power by government, the self-
governing or “autonomous” individual resides “at the heart” of this new form of social con-
trol.32  Freedom does not oppose this new modality of power, but rather operates within it.  
Thus, she argues, Foucault’s recourse to ancient ethical practices of freedom or care of the self 
as a resource for countering the self as enterprise appears depoliticizing, atomistic, and ulti-
mately anemic.  As she puts the point: “the experimental process of self-formation that this 
idea revolves around is uncomfortably close in structure to governance through individualiza-
tion, and it is therefore not clear how such an atomized practice can pose any serious challenge 
to neoliberal social control.”33  McNay’s critique raises several questions.  Is ethical work on 
the self only justifiable insofar as it represents a political challenge to neoliberal social control? 
And even if the answer is no, is it still possible that such ethical practices could challenge this 
new form of social control, and if so, how?34 
As it turns out Foucault was not entirely disinterested in the idea of the self as enter-
prise.  As Andrew Dilts observes, in this “radically empty theory of subjectivity. ...the anthro-
pological figure who carries a biographical subjectivity is now gone.”35  Thus space is opened 
within up within neoliberalism for an appropriation of the “freedom” associated with self as 
enterprise.  Foucault understands the self as a relational form, a self-relation that is filled in 
through practices of the self.  These involve taking up materials available within the cultures 
and spaces in which one finds oneself, not creation ex nihilo.  Presumably even liberalism and 
Marxism provide resources that might be taken up differently, put to different uses.  After all, 
                                                 
31 Aside from prisons, one might also consider the way in which increased access to free online education 
could become a justification for decreasing students’ access to the variety of educational experiences provid-
ed in colleges and universities. 
32 McNay, 62.   
33 Ibid., 57.   
34 I will not engage the charge that ethical practices of freedom are atomizing here except to say that cultivat-
ing new forms of self-relationship could easily be understood as something that requires the support and 
guidance of others.  Indeed one might be drawn into a community because if offers new ways of living.  
Creating desirable alternatives to dominant ways of living is one way to channel the desires of others in a 
new direction. 
35 Andrew Dilts, “From ‘Entrepreneur of the Self’ to ‘Care of the Self’: Neoliberal Governmentality and Fou-
cault’s Ethics,” Foucault Studies (12) (2011), 130-146, 137.   




this is the point of Foucault’s genealogical tracing of concepts and practices that can combine, 
weave together, come apart and recombine like strands in a rope to produce contingently 
linked strategies or complexes of power/knowledge relations.  The point is not that we can 
voluntarily redirect and control the direction of history, but that we can, sometimes, unravel 
the strands or participate in a process that may in fact produce something different.  This is 
what neoliberals did.  They reinterpreted concepts such as “capitalism,” “freedom,” “competi-
tion,” “the state,” “government,” to implement a plan for a new form of governmentality.  Just 
as Foucault suggested that we might resist disciplinary power by separating its capacity-
enhancing features from its docility rendering functions36, so to we might divorce the appeal 
to freedom in the idea of the self as enterprise from its connections with neoliberal forms of 
normalization. 
Foucault understood that detaching ourselves from subjection would require work on 
the self, undoing old habits of thinking and doing and cultivating new ones.  Perhaps his in-
terest in the idea of the self as a project found in neoliberalism stemmed from his sense that it 
might be possible for one to divorce oneself from the “truths” about how best to live being 
proffered within its frame without sacrificing the idea of the self as a project.  Foucault alludes 
to this possibility when he remarks 
 
For centuries we have been convinced that between our ethics, our personal ethics, our eve-
ryday life, and the great political and social and economic structures, there were analytical 
relations, and that we couldn’t change anything, for instance, in our sex life or our family 
life, without ruining the economy, our democracy, and so on.  I think we have to get rid of 
the idea of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or economic or po-
litical structures.37  
 
Foucault’s aimed in part to show us that we are “freer than we feel,” that in actuality we are 
not always trapped within the trends that we capture in our reflections upon what is happen-
ing in the present.38  The very act of reflecting upon them, observing how they work, how they 
came to be, can distance us from them in ways that open the space for other possibilities to 
emerge.39 
Furthermore, Foucault’s turn to ethics does not imply that ethical self-constitution, de-
veloping other ways of living, is the only thing we should do, but given the spread of neolib-
eral governmentality, it is reasonable to conclude that experiments with forming other ways of 
life, new forms of relationality, understandings of self, habits of relating to oneself and others 
are necessary.  They not only require us, as Kant did, to relate to ourselves as free, but they test 
the limits of present possibilities through practices of self-constitution within communities 
                                                 
36 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 317.  
37 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: Overview of a Work in Progress,” in Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984: Volume One, Ethics, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert Hurley (NY: The New Press), 
261. 
38 Michel Foucault, “Truth, Power, and the Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault, October 25, 1982, in 
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, edited by Rex Martin, et. al. (Massachusetts: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 10. 
39 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 130. 
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that refuse to conform to reigning habits of thinking and ways of being, and thereby prefigure 
other possible futures at a time after any specific liberation.  Thus, for example, when he re-
marks that liberation “is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that will still 
be needed... to define admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society”40, we 
should take him to suggest that being freed from any given form of domination or oppression 
still leaves us with the need to create something to be free for.  And caring for ourselves, test-
ing the limits of the present, might be one way of addressing this need. 
We need not accept McNay’s criticism of Foucault’s ethical turn for several reasons.  
First, that neoliberal governmental rationality has spread does not mean that there are no 
spaces untouched by its grip on the present.  Indeed, to analyze the emergence of a form of 
governmentality out of past ways of thinking and doing is not tantamount to describing a sys-
tem that has sewn up every space.  Second, as I have noted, the idea of the self as enterprise 
presents the possibility of divorcing the idea of freedom entailed within it from the economic 
and social truths to which it is yoked.  Third, even if ethical work on the self does not serve as 
a form of political resistance, there are reasons to pursue it.  Cultivating other forms of life, 
other types of relational possibilities and understandings aside from those prevalent within 
neoliberal governmentality can not only sustain marginal groups and populations within the 
dominant frame, but also provide relatively sustaining communities from which individuals 
can enter the political sphere while still keeping possibilities for non-entrepreneurial self-
relationships alive.  Will any or all of these experiments be rendered inert by an encroaching 
neoliberal commodification and regulation?  Possibly, but this is not an argument against pur-
suing them.    
Perhaps what is missing in McNay’s analysis is an appreciation of what queer theorist 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick refers to as “the middle ranges of agency that offer space for effectual 
creativity and change.”41  Sedgwick’s evocation of a “middle range” of agency between subjec-
tion and freedom, autonomy and heteronomy, with or against, has not had the impact on criti-
cal theory that it could.42  Sedgwick rejects these false alternatives, preferring instead to look 
for and participate in the many different and creative ways in which people make their lives 
livable, even pleasurable or humorous, within the often intolerable and oppressive conditions 
in which they find themselves.  Linking critical theorists’ preoccupations with prohibition and 
repression to a tendency toward the paranoid readings typical of a hermeneutics of suspicion 
and its strategy of exposure, Sedgwick describes another kind of reading practice, “reparative 
reading,” from which we can learn, she says, “the many ways selves and communities succeed 
in extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture—even of a culture whose avowed desire 
has often been not to sustain them.”43  Here she not only echoes Foucault’s later writings on 
                                                 
40 Foucault, “The Ethic of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Essential Works of Foucault, 
Vol. I:  Ethics, edited by Paul Rabinow, translated by Robert Hurley (NY: The New Press), 282–3. 
41 Sedgwick, 13.   
42 I am reminded here of queer theorists recuperation of the radical potential of butch lesbianism, a way of 
being often interpreted within second wave feminism as a form of male identification—a problematic form 
of subjection.  In contrast queer theorists have attempted to bypass this binary logic, or at least deconstruct it, 
by drawing attention to the possibility that the masculine can be a form of femininity.  See Butler.  
43 Sedgwick, 150-151.   




ethics where he describes modes of self-transformation that involve reworking the materials 
made available within a culture, but also links them to a reading practice oriented toward cul-
tural innovation and experimentation rather than polemical opposition and exposure. 
Sharing as she does Foucault’s skepticism about psychoanalytic discourses of desire 
that assume “the centrality of sexual desire to all human contact and feeling,” and treat the 
sexual drive as the ultimate source of “human motivation, identity and emotion,” Sedgwick 
returns to the history of psychoanalysis and psychology as a resource for thinking otherwise.44  
It is as if she were asking: What in effect was lying beside those discursive events that was 
overshadowed or left behind and what work might these past ideas do in the present?45 
In collaborative work with Adam Frank, Sedgwick engages the writings of the philoso-
pher and theorist of affect, Silvan Tomkins and urges queer theorists to exploit affect theory in 
order to gain a perspective on the unquestioned consensus about the obvious value of continu-
ing to reproduce dominant critical strategies of exposure or denaturalization—both versions of 
the repressive hypothesis, which Foucault deployed in his earliest books and decried in Histo-
ry of Sexuality Volume One.  For example, Tomkins did not understand shame, an especially 
important affect for both women and queers, as an emotional and behavioral response to dis-
approval or transgression, but rather as an experience of having one’s interest or joy inhibited.  
Thus, when others do not respond in a familiar way to one’s excitements and engagements, 
shame and reduction of interest can be the result.  Humiliation can shut down curiosity and 
excitement.  It can lead to defensive, rigid and paranoid postures, and to fear of making mis-
takes.  Yet, it is also an indicator of a suppressed capacity for joy, excitement, and curiosity 
that might have reparative effects. 
Attachments to paranoid readings associated with the repressive hypothesis appear as 
defense mechanisms rooted in negative affects like shame.  They aim to foreclose exposure by 
exposing, to forestall pain rather than to maximize or seek pleasure, to avoid error, to hide 
shame by performing pride.  In contrast, reparative readings resist the inhibiting effects of 
shame, risk being wrong.  Sedgwick suggests that seeking pleasure through reparative read-
ing might be compared to the ethical possibilities associated with Foucault’s appeal to care of 
the self that she describes as “the often very fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 17-18. 
45 Sedgwick brings the preposition “beside” into play as a supplement to more standard critical practices that 
rely upon the beneath and the beyond.  “Beside is an interesting preposition,” she says, “because there is 
nothing very dualistic about it.” (Sedgwick, 8)  There is nothing linear or temporal about it either. In other 
words, using this “spatial descriptor” she wants to find alternatives to exposing essentialisms, identifying 
hidden structures or patterns.  She sets aside dialectical, polemical and oppositional thinking as well.  Her 
point is not that they should be rejected entirely, but that other modes of thinking might also be fruitful for 
furthering practices of freedom.  The beside involves treating the social field as a space in which there are 
multiple simultaneous events (subjective and non-subjective) occurring, only some of which are captured 
within extant narrative or theoretical frameworks.  For example, insofar as one thinks only in binary terms of 
either-or, homo- or hetero-, mind or body, biological or cultural, cause or effect, before and after, beneath 
and beyond and so forth, one overlooks events that might become the basis of other historical trajectories 
and other social networks.  See also Ladelle McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual 
Normalization (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009) for a reading of Foucault as challenging binary 
thinking. 
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and nourishment in an environment that is perceived as not particularly offering them.”46 
Thus, like Foucault, she regards ethical innovation in part as a creative and innovative strategy 
for survival—an aesthetics of existence.   
One of Foucault’s abiding values was curiosity and he was certainly sensitive to the do-
cility rendering impact of shame within disciplinary regimes.  Indeed, he once confessed that 
he dreamt of a “new age of curiosity” because he believed that we suffer from “too little: from 
...channels that are too narrow, skimpy, quasi-monopolistic, insufficient.”47  His queer ethical 
project was designed to open up these channels.48  
 
Conclusion 
I have appropriated the idea of queerness, a term and theoretical orientation that may be wan-
ing, one that some regard as inadequate to the task of resisting the dangerous trends in neolib-
eral capitalism, in order to capture a certain ethos in a promising strand of feminist thought—a 
queer feminism aimed at opening up possibilities for thinking and being, testing the limits of 
the possible.  Emancipatory feminism too often subsumes the ethical under the political as-
suming that normative democratic political theory is sufficient to address injustice.  Moreover, 
concerns about the gap between our theories of subjection, and our ongoing attachment to 
subordinating self-understandings—the problem of agency—have plagued feminism for at 
least 25 years.  What I have argued here is that there are still more resources in Foucault and 
queer theory for feminists to exploit in their efforts to address or escape these problematiza-
tions.  In particular, I have highlighted the queer ethical practices of freedom associated not 
only with genealogical mapping of power/knowledge relations and reparative reading, but 
also with appropriating materials available in the present to create new possibilities for living 
in a post-revolutionary world—a world in which Western ideals might continually be contest-
ed and redeployed in ways that do not unnecessarily reduce possibilities and constrain free-








                                                 
46 Sedgwick, 137.   
47 Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works of Foucault, 
1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (NY: The New Press, 1994), 178.  
48 Thanks go to Cressida Heyes, Allison Weir and anonymous reviewers for Foucault Studies for significant 
improvements in this paper. 
